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Abstract: Current responses to the question of how one should adjust one's 
beliefs in response to peer disagreement have, in general, formed a spectrum at 
one end of which sit the so-called ‘conciliatory’ views and whose other end is 
occupied by the ‘steadfast’ views. While the conciliatory views of disagreement 
maintain that one is required to make doxastic conciliation when faced with an 
epistemic peer who holds a different stance on a particular subject, the 
steadfast views allow us to maintain our confidence in our relevant beliefs. My 
aim in this paper is not to adjudicate between these views. Rather, I shall focus 
on a particular strategy, namely, denying the appearance of epistemic 
symmetry between peers, that the steadfast views standardly invoke in support 
of their position. Having closely examined certain representative examples of 
the steadfast approach, I will argue that this strategy is fundamentally flawed. 
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It is common for equally competent epistemic agents to arrive at different 
conclusions in regard to a particular subject matter on the basis of roughly the 
same body of evidence. Although it is rarely possible for two people to share all 
their evidence, let us, idealizing away from the actual cases, call two agents, S1 
and S2, epistemic peers if they are equal with respect to the general intellectual 
virtues and are acquainted with the same evidence E in regard to a particular 
proposition p. Suppose further that, having reached different conclusions on the 
basis of E, they are then apprised of each other's competing views about p but 
continue to disagree. The question of what epistemic peers ought to do under 
such circumstances constitutes the main concern of the epistemology of 
disagreement. 
There are roughly two fundamental positions on the proper epistemic 
response to a situation involving peer disagreement. According to the so-called 
‘conciliatory’ views, S1 and S2 should revise their attitudes towards p, though the 
extent of such revisions varies depending on how conciliatory the views in 
question are.1 In the opposite direction, one finds the so-called ‘steadfast’ views 
which require peers to maintain their confidence in their attitudes in the face of 
                                                                        
1 See, for example, Feldman 2006, Christensen 2007 and Elga 2007. 
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disagreement.2 My aim in this paper is not to adjudicate between these views. 
Rather, I wish to focus on a strategy that the steadfast views standardly invoke in 
support of their position and against conciliationism. Having closely examined 
certain representative examples of the steadfast approach, I will try to show that 
this strategy is fundamentally flawed. 
1. Reasonable Disagreement after Full Disclosure: The Questions 
Consider again our agents S1 and S2 who hold different attitudes towards a 
proposition p on the basis of the evidence E. Suppose while S1 believes that p is 
true, S2 believes that it is false. The fundamental question is whether they can 
reasonably maintain their beliefs after becoming fully aware of each other's 
views. Following Feldman (2006; 2007), it is important to realize that the 
question of the possibility of reasonable disagreement actually boils down to two 
questions. 
(a) Can both S1 and S2 reasonably maintain their beliefs after learning of the 
other's opinion? 
(b) Can both S1 and S2 reasonably continue to disagree after disclosure while at 
the same time think that the other's belief is reasonable as well? 
To say yes to the first question is to admit that reasonable disagreement 
after full disclosure is possible, while a positive answer to the second question is 
tantamount to admitting that it is also possible to have mutually recognized 
disagreement. It is arguable that intellectual humility requires that the steadfast 
views have the resources to answer the second question in the positive. It is, 
thus, the question (b) that is going to feature prominently in our discussion of 
the steadfast views. 
1.1. Steadfast Views: The Standard Strategy  
As noted earlier, there is a major divide separating positions on the issue of the 
possibility of reasonable disagreement. There are, on the one hand, the 
conciliatory views that require epistemic peers to temper their views in the face 
of disagreement and there are, on the other hand, the steadfast views that allow 
peers to maintain confidence in their beliefs after disclosure. The steadfast views 
are, however, initially puzzling for it is difficult to see how peers who are 
recognized to be roughly equal in terms of intellectual virtues can reach and 
maintain incompatible, and yet equally reasonable, beliefs on the basis of the 
same body of evidence. If the peer relationship involves evidential as well as 
general intellectual equality, how can S1 and S2 come to adopt incompatible 
attitudes towards a particular proposition p? Moreover, how can they 
reasonably maintain their respective attitudes when, after full disclosure, they 
come to be apprised of all their evidence, background beliefs, etc.? What is it that 
                                                                        
2 See, for example, Kelly 2005, Bergmann 2009 and Goldman 2010. 
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gives, S1, for example, the right to maintain her belief and resist the epistemic 
pull of S2's contrary opinion? The same can be asked of S2 and her belief. 
A natural strategy (henceforth, 'the standard strategy'), for the steadfast 
view, is to deny the appearance of epistemic symmetry between peers. However, 
given our assumptions, any putative asymmetry must be characterized in terms 
other than the agents' general intellectual virtues or their normal body of 
evidence. It might, for example, be claimed3 that S1 possesses insights about the 
disputed proposition that S2 lacks or that S1 and S2 are employing different 
systems of epistemic norms (Goldman 2010).4 Whatever the merits of these 
suggestions, what is important to note is that no steadfast account of the 
possibility of reasonable disagreement can come for free. The initial epistemic 
symmetry between peers has to be broken at some point along the way. If the 
parties to a dispute are to maintain different attitudes in regard to a particular 
topic this should be traced back to some prior difference on their part. It is 
difficult to see how, despite the full epistemic symmetry, peers can rationally 
arrive at different conclusions in regard to a particular subject matter. To see 
this, let us consider a recent steadfast account of the possibility of reasonable 
disagreement due to Marc Moffett (2007). 
While agreeing that the most plausible line of defense for a steadfast 
response to our central question is to appeal to some sort of epistemic difference 
on the part of the peers, Moffett claims that it is possible to avoid downgrading 
their competence while maintaining that they can reasonably hold on to their 
views. The trick is “to take advantage of the transient underdetermination of 
theory by evidence” (Moffet, 2007, 360). It is not, however, clear why the 
postulation of an epistemic asymmetry between peers is tantamount to 
downgrading their competence. To assume that S1 and S2 are equal with respect 
to general intellectual virtues is consistent with the possibility of one of them 
being more competent or reliable on a particular topic. More importantly, 
however, the appeal to the underdetermination thesis hardly explains the claim 
that the same body of evidence (E) can rationalize two contradictory claims p 
and not-p. If E supports p (to a sufficient degree), then it would be reasonable to 
believe p on that basis. But this would, in turn, entail that it is not reasonable to 
believe not-p. It is therefore not clear how the same body of evidence can 
rationalize two contradictory beliefs. To say that the beliefs (theories) are 
underdetermined by E is merely to repeat the claim in question. The 
underdetermination thesis is, in other words, semantically too close to the claim 
that reasonable disagreement is possible to explain it.  
Moreover, assuming that the underdetermination thesis is true, it can, at 
most, explain how reasonable disagreement is possible before disclosure (i.e., in 
isolation). It does not tell us why S1 and S2 can maintain confidence in their 
                                                                        
3 For example, van Inwagen 1996 and Bergmann 2009. 
4 For a different account of asymmetry in terms of the information one has about onself and 
one's opponent see Sosa 2010. 
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beliefs after disclosure. After all, the conciliationists claim that when S1 and S2 
learn that the other holds a different attitude, on the basis of the same evidence, 
the awareness of this fact would provide a defeater for their beliefs. 
In response, Moffett appeals to Sklar's principle of methodological 
conservatism (MC) according to which it would be reasonable to hold on to a 
hypothesis despite coming to know of evidentially equivalent alternatives (Sklar 
1975). But (MC) is precisely what the concilaitionists are challenging. Unless 
Moffett can provide some independent justification for (MC), he cannot, on pain 
of begging the question against the conciliationists, appeal to it to defend his 
steadfast view. He does, however, make some remarks in defense of (MC) by 
referring to Harman's (1986) observation that some such conservative principle 
is indispensable to our epistemic well-being for  
if we are not able to rely on our standing beliefs without re-verifying them or – 
what is cognitively impossible for creatures like us – carrying along our 
justifications, we will be unable to make justifiable progress in our theoretical 
undertakings (Moffet 2007, 361).  
But Harman's observation actually concerns a different version of the thesis of 
epistemic conservatism according to which one is justified to continue to hold a 
belief as long as there are no good reasons against it. What underpins Harman's 
principle of conservatism is the phenomenon that people do not usually keep 
track of the justification relations among their beliefs which is presumably why 
they tend to preserve their beliefs in the face of evidential discrediting.5 These 
considerations hardly lend any support to (MC). 
Moffett seems to realize that Harman's principle is not sufficient to 
establish (MC) and, thus, his version of the steadfast view. He, thus, chooses to 
highlight, what he takes to be, the implausible skeptical consequences of the 
conciliatory views (like Feldman's), namely, that they would be ‘epistemically 
devastating’ if consistently applied across the board. But this remark is hardly 
relevant to our concerns here, not least because not all versions of 
conciliationism have such implications. Moffett's animadversions, thus, seem to 
lead nowhere. However, he makes one final observation in defense of his view 
claiming that holding to one's beliefs has certain cognitive advantages in that it 
helps us develop and refine theoretical frameworks and worldviews.  
But are such alleged advantages to be counted as epistemic reasons for 
beliefs? Yes, he thinks, unless one  
[construes] the epistemic in an inappropriately narrow manner, as reasons 
which the belief itself is more likely to be true (Moffett 2007, 363).  
But this revisionist step threatens to change the rules of the game, for it is no 
longer clear that he can continue to characterize an individual x as an  
                                                                        
5 For an analysis of Harman's version of epistemic conservatism see Vahid 2004. 
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epistemic peer with respect to a given domain (if and) only if we regard x's 
judgments concerning that domain to be as likely as our own to be correct 
given the same evidence (Moffett 2007, 356).  
More importantly, for our purposes here, the appeal to the pragmatic 
virtues of belief perseverance as reasons for why epistemic peers can hold on to 
their beliefs in the face of disagreement is to postulate an asymmetry, though not 
in the space of reasons but, in the space of pragmatic considerations. Just as the 
appeal to insights might help justify why epistemic peers can reasonably hold on 
to their beliefs after disclosure, so does the appeal to the purported pragmatic 
consequences of maintaining such beliefs. Either way, no steadfast view comes 
for free as, one way or another, it is forced to appeal to factors regarding which 
epistemic peers diverge. Let us then return to our main question and examine 
some steadfast views that employ the standard strategy to show how reasonable 
disagreement is possible. I begin with a recent account (due to Goldman 2010) 
that locates the required asymmetry in the systems of epistemic norms that are 
said to license the agents' beliefs. 
2. Objectivity-based Relativism as the Basis of Reasonable Disagreement 
To show that reasonable disagreement is possible, Goldman appeals to two 
fundamental theses of epistemic objectivism and epistemic relativism. He takes 
‘objectivism’ to mean that there is a uniquely right epistemic system (E-system) 
comprising of rules and norms directed at doxastic attitudes. Thus, according to 
objectivism, for any proposition p, a right E-system determines what attitude 
someone should adopt towards p on the basis of some evidence e. The thesis of 
epistemic relativism, on the other hand, construes justification statements as 
covertly referring to the E-system the speaker accepts. The combination of these 
elements, Goldman thinks, would provide a solid basis for the possibility of 
reasonable disagreement. To see this, consider our two agents S1 and S2 
believing p and not-p respectively on the basis of the same evidence E. Suppose, 
in accordance with Goldman's objectivity-based-relativism (OBR-) account of 
justification, S1 and S2 operate with two different epistemic systems, E1-system 
and E2-system respectively that authorize different attitudes towards p. Since, by 
hypothesis, there is a uniquely correct E-system, this means that S1 and S2 cannot 
be both objectively (O-)justified in their beliefs. So, at the level of the target 
proposition p, at least one of those agents is unreasonable or unjustified. Does 
this mean that the story for the possibility of reasonable disagreement is over? 
No, for Goldman thinks that his OBR-account of epistemic justification has the 
resources to show how S1 and S2 can reasonably maintain their beliefs on the 
basis of the same evidence E. 
To show this, Goldman starts by claiming that S1 and S2 are both O-
justified in believing their respective E-systems or individual E-norms. To defend 
this claim, he asks us to consider communities and cultures where young 
children and people are instructed by their elders to believe and follow certain 
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E-norms like “If the Scripture says p, you should believe that p” or “If scientists 
agree on p, you should assign a high credence to p.” He further assumes that 
these "children hear roughly the same testimony from numerous elders and no 
conflicting testimony" (Goldman 2010, 198). Such scenarios, he thinks, provide 
examples in which an incorrect E-norm is O-justifiably believed to be correct. 
These norms would, in turn, sanction incompatible attitudes in regard to 
particular propositions. How does this bear on the question of whether 
reasonable disagreement is possible? According to Goldman, since S1 and S2 are 
O-justified in believing the E1-norm and E2-norm respectively, they may also 
enjoy a distinct but significant justificational status for the target beliefs those 
norms authorize. So while they may not be first-order O-justified in their beliefs, 
they are, nonetheless, iteratively O-justified in holding those beliefs, that is, we 
can say of, say, S1 that “S1 is O-justified in believing that she is O-justified in 
believing p.” 
Likewise for S2. Although second-order O-justifiedness does not entail 
first-order O-justifiedness, it does, says Goldman, make a significant contribution 
towards the reasonability of a first-order belief as he denies that the first-order 
justificational status of an attitude fixes its overall reasonability. By bringing 
epistemic norms to bear on the reasonability of the target beliefs, Goldman 
admits that he is, in effect, claiming that S1's and S2's total evidence differ. For 
although they have, what he calls, the same ‘material’ evidence (E), their norm 
evidence (E1/E2-norms) differ which is why their attitudes towards p can 
legitimately diverge. Thus, an OBR-account of epistemic justification, he 
concludes, can explain how divergent attitudes based on the same body of 
evidence can be both reasonable. 
There are, however, a number of places in Goldman's argument for the 
possibility of reasonable of disagreement where one can take issue with it. By 
appealing to an OBR-account of justification, Goldman is obviously implementing 
the standard strategy to defend his version of the steadfast view. He only 
chooses to construe the required epistemic asymmetry in terms of different 
epistemic norms that guide the agents' doxastic behavior. Thus, while S1 adopts 
the E1-norm to arrive at p, S2 adopts the E2-norm to arrive at not-p. To assess 
Goldman's account of the possibility of reasonable disagreement, I propose to 
examine it in view of the following questions: (1) Is Goldman's account internally 
coherent? And (2) does it successfully explain how reasonable disagreement is 
possible? I begin with the first question. 
What makes Goldman say that the epistemic agents (like the children of 
his example) are O-justified in believing incompatible E-systems or E-norms? 
Presumably, this is because they adopt their E-norms on the basis of different 
testimonial evidence coming from their elders in different communities. 
Consonant with his norm-based account of epistemic justification, Goldman 
thinks that S1's and S2's O-justified beliefs in their pertinent E-systems 
themselves also involve norms (though of a more fundamental kind). These 
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fundamental norms are source authorizations like the following ‘generic 
testimony-based norm’ pertinent to his example involving children: “If a random 
speaker or writer testifies that p, then (in the absence of defeating conditions) 
the agent should believe that p.” So there are actually two kinds of evidence 
involved here that ground S1's and S2's beliefs in their incompatible E-norms. 
There is the norm evidence, like the generic testimony-based norm above, and 
there is the material evidence consisting of the different testimonies that the 
children obtain in the form of instructions form their elders. 
Suppose we agree that, on the basis of their total evidence, S1 and S2 are 
justified in believing that their respective E-norms are correct. On the basis of 
these norms, S1 and S2 then go on to hold different attitudes towards p even 
though they happen to share the same material evidence E. As we have seen, 
however, Goldman denies that S1 and S2 can be both O-justified in holding 
different attitudes towards the target proposition p. But it is not clear why S1 and 
S2 can be O-justified at the norm level but not O-justified at the target-belief level. 
That is, it is not clear why S1 and S2 can be O-justified in holding different 
attitudes about the correct E-system but fail to be O-justified in holding 
incompatible attitudes towards p. For, on both levels, they have the same type of 
total evidence consisting of appropriate norm evidence as well material 
evidence. The only difference seems that, at the norm level, it is the norm 
evidence that is shared by S1 and S2 with their material evidence varying while, 
at the target-proposition level, it is the material evidence E that is fixed with the 
norm evidence being different (E1/E2-norms). So if S1 and S2 can be both O-
justified at the norm level because their total evidence differs, there is no reason 
why they cannot also be O-justified at the target-proposition level. Indeed, if, as 
Goldman claims, S1 and S2 are both O-justified in believing the correctness of the 
E1-norm and the E2-norm respectively, then, obviously enough, they should also 
be O-justified in believing what these norms authorize. A belief that is grounded 
in another belief that is O-justified is itself O-justified. 
It might be argued that what grounds the distinctness of the epistemic 
status of S1 and S2 at these two levels has to do with the fact that the E1-norm and 
the E2-norm cannot both belong to the uniquely correct E-system. At least one of 
these norms must be incorrect and so must the belief it sanctions. But this point 
is irrelevant to what is at issue here which is justification not truth. A belief can 
be false and yet O-justified. What counts for justification at both the norm and 
the target-proposition levels is one's total evidence which might include 
misleading evidence. As Goldman himself emphasizes, truth is not necessary for 
justification:  
what determines a belief's reasonability is the agent's evidence…The same 
point holds on the topic of norm correctness. The actual rightness of an E-
system does not determine the reasonability of an agent's conforming to it. 
What is critical is the agent's evidence about its rightness. If an agent conforms 
her attitude to the prescriptions of a properly chosen E-system, this should be 
an important – perhaps decisive – element in assessing the attitude's 
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reasonability, even if the evidence supporting that E-system's rightness 
happens to be misleading (Goldman 2010, 206).  
Accordingly, since both S1 and S2 have evidence for their adopted E-norms 
(which is why they are said to be both O-justified in believing them), they are 
also O-justified in holding the attitudes that those norms license about p. So, they 
can also be O-justified at the level of the target proposition despite having 
misleading evidence.  
I think Goldman's inconsistent treatment of the agents' beliefs at the norm 
and the target-proposition levels arises from his expressed wish to combine 
elements form both objectivism and relativism in his theory of epistemic 
justification. On the one hand, the objectivist ingredient prompts him to link  
justifiedness not to any random E-system but to a right E-system, 
because…[o]nly a right epistemic system has the appropriate connection with 
objective justifiedness (Goldman 2010, 193)  
or reasonability. This, in turn, leads him to deny that S1 and S2 can both be O-
justified in holding different attitudes at the target-proposition level. The 
relativist ingredient, on the other hand, impels him to say that the  
actual rightness of an E-system does not determine the reasonability of an 
agent's conforming to it (Goldman 2010, 206)  
which is presumably why he claims that S1 and S2 are both O-justified in 
adopting different E-systems. Let us now turn to our main question of whether 
Goldman's OBR-account of epistemic justification can successfully explain the 
possibility of reasonable disagreement. We need to address this question both 
before and after the agents come to know of their respective views. I start with 
the possibility of reasonable disagreement before full disclosure. 
According to Goldman, reasonable disagreement before disclosure is 
possible because S1 and S2 are iteratively, though not first-order, justified in 
holding different attitudes towards p. This contention is, as we have seen, in 
turn, grounded in Goldman's claim that the agents are O-justified in believing 
that their incompatible E-norms are correct. There are, however, a number of 
ways that this latter claim can be challenged. Recall Goldman's example of the 
children in isolated communities who adopt incompatible E-norms on the basis 
of their elders' advice. Now, given Goldman's ‘reliabilist criterion of [E-]system 
superiority’ (Goldman 2010, 194), shouldn't those testimonial sources 
themselves be reliable if the children are to be objectively (O-)justified in 
believing their E-norms? One may concede that the children enjoy some sort of 
justification for their beliefs but objective justification seems to require that their 
evidence be, at least, reliably adequate.  
Indeed, Goldman's examples resemble the so-called ‘epistemic poverty 
cases’ in the philosophical literature which are often invoked to show the 
inadequacy of deontological justification. To say that a belief p is deontologically 
justified is to say that in holding that belief, an agent has flouted no (subjective) 
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epistemic obligations, and is, thus, subject to no blame or disapproval. A 
standard way to express the thought that an agent is deontologically justified in 
believing p is to say that he is iteratively justified (in a truth-conducive sense) in 
holding that belief.6 The deontological conception of justification has been 
criticized for, among other things, failing to give us what we expect of epistemic 
justification. The thought behind this criticism is often formulated in terms of the 
so-called ‘epistemic poverty cases’ where, despite doing all that can be 
reasonably expected of agents, they form their beliefs on less than adequate 
grounds. One such case, ‘the cultural isolation case’ (Alston 1988), involves an 
agent, S, growing up in an isolated community in which everyone unquestionably 
accepts the traditions of the tribe as authoritative. Having had no opportunity to 
come across circumstances in which this authority is challenged, S can hardly be 
blamed for holding beliefs that are grounded in the traditions. He is thus 
deontologically justified in holding those beliefs despite the beliefs being 
unjustified (in a truth-conducive sense). 
The epistemic circumstances of S are similar to those of the children in 
Goldman's scenario who are said to be exposed to “no conflicting testimon[ies].” 
It, thus, seems unreasonable to describe the children in Goldman's example as 
having objectively (O-)justified belief in their epistemic norms. Indeed, Goldman 
himself, when challenged on this issue, goes on to concede that he can be taken 
to be addressing a conception of “justification [that is] grounded entirely in one's 
subjective perspective” (Goldman 2010, 199, fn.9). Of course, once we grant that 
the agents are only iteratively justified in believing their adopted E-norms, it 
would be quite plausible to think (with Goldman) that they are also iteratively 
justified in holding beliefs that those E-norms sanction. In this case there would 
be no inconsistency in the treatment of beliefs at the norm and the target-
proposition levels. However, as we can see, this requires giving up on the notion 
of objectivity that Goldman's account involves. 
Another reason for denying objective justifiedness at the norm level is 
this: Any explanation of the possibility of reasonable disagreement between 
epistemic peers that helps itself with the assumption that they are O-justified in 
believing their respective E-norms would be question-begging. For suppose we 
assume, with Goldman, that S1 and S2 are O-justified in believing incompatible E-
norms. To say this, however, is to admit that reasonable disagreement is 
possible. So, on pain of circularity, this assumption cannot be used as a premise 
(as in Goldman's account) to justify the conclusion that reasonable disagreement 
is possible. Differently put, Goldman manages to show that reasonable 
disagreement is possible at the level of the target proposition only by assuming it 
at another level, namely, the norm level.  
Finally, suppose we agree, with Goldman, that S1 and S2 are only iteratively 
justified in holding different beliefs about p. Does this settle the issue of 
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reasonable disagreement before closure? No, because the notion of iterative 
justifiedness is too weak. Indeed, one could already acknowledge this fact about 
the agents without buying into Goldman's conceptual framework. To say, for 
example, that S1 is iteratively justified in believing p is, as we have seen, to say 
that she is deontologically justified in holding that belief and that she has flouted 
none of her epistemic obligations in forming that belief. In other words, it is to 
say that her belief is blameless and responsibly formed. But this is something 
one could already acknowledge about such agents having assumed that they are 
rational peers. 
Let us now see how Goldman's observations bear on the question of the 
possibility of disagreement after full disclosure. Hardly at all, it seems. Indeed, by 
the end of his discussion, Goldman confesses that his approach is only intended 
to address the issue of reasonable disagreement in isolation (or ‘synchronic 
disagreement’ as he calls it). It is not concerned with the ‘diachronic’ question, 
namely, with how an agent should epistemically react when, having formed her 
belief at t, she comes to know of her peer's contrary opinion at a later time t'. I 
end my discussion of Goldman, however, by arguing that not only his account is 
silent about whether one can reasonably maintain her belief after disclosure, it 
cannot recognize such a possibility.  
To see this, we may recall that, to argue for the possibility of reasonable 
disagreement at the level of the target proposition, Goldman needed the premise 
that it is possible for agents to be O-justified at the norm level. The argument for 
this premise, on the other hand, consisted of Goldman's presenting a case, “a 
likely scenario in many communities both historical and contemporary” 
(Goldman 2010, 198) where, he claims, it is easy to see how agents can be O-
justified in believing incompatible E-norms. The case involved children living in 
communities where they follow their elders and teachers about certain matters 
without much critical discussion and without being exposed to “conflicting 
testimon[ies]” (Goldman 2010, 198). What this implies is that intellectual or 
epistemic isolation is necessary if Goldman's scenario is to give him the premise 
he wants. However, with such a requirement in force, Goldman's agents can 
hardly proceed to a state of full disclosure. For, after disclosure, when their 
intellectual isolation ends, they will no longer be entitled to having O-justified 
beliefs in their E-norms, and, thus, there would be nothing that would authorize 
them to have different attitudes towards the target proposition p. After full 
disclosure, there will be no opportunity to maintain reasonable disagreement. In 
view of its structure, Goldman's account of reasonable disagreement is bound to 
crumble in the state of full disclosure. I shall now turn to another defense of the 
steadfast view (due to Bergmann 2009) that also appeals to the standard 
strategy. 
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3. Insights and Error Theories as the Bases of Reasonable Disagreement 
Right from the start, Bergmann states that his target is to explain how 
reasonable disagreement is possible after full disclosure. Following Plantinga, he 
distinguishes between two kinds of rationality, internal and external rationality. 
A belief is internally rational if and only if it is an epistemically appropriate 
response to the agent's evidence (consisting of her mental states). Internal 
rationality, thus, concerns the epistemic standing of a belief downstream from 
experience. One might, thus, say of the beliefs of a brain a in a vat (BIV) or a 
victim of the Cartesian demon that they are internally rational or justified. 
External rationality, on the other hand, requires that, in addition, the agent's 
cognitive mechanism be functioning properly. This means that since the BIV's 
experiential evidence is due to malfunction, her beliefs are not externally 
rational.  
Bergmann then appeals to the standard strategy to show that, whichever 
conception of rationality is in place, mutually recognized reasonable 
disagreement is possible. Unlike the previous steadfast views, he does not 
construe the required epistemic asymmetry in terms of pragmatic 
considerations or epistemic norms. Rather, he unpacks it in terms of the insights 
that agents might possess. Thus, we might say of two agents, S1 and S2, that they 
differ not only with respect to their attitudes towards p but also in regard to, 
what Bergmann calls, their broader outlooks O1 and O2 which he takes to include 
the following ingredients. 
O1 • p 
• a theory of error (applied to epistemic peers who believe the key 
ingredients of O2) according to which the apparent insight that underpins 
the key ingredients of O2 is not a genuine insight 
O2 • not-p 
• a theory of error (applied to epistemic peers who believe the key 
ingredients of O1) according to which the apparent insight that underpins 
the key ingredients of O1 is not a genuine insight 
So before S1 learns of S2's contrary view, she has apparent insights that 
both p and the error theory in O1 are true. The right response to these insights is 
to believe p and the associated error theory. Thus, both these beliefs are, by 
definition, internally rational. We can further stipulate, says Bergmann, that, 
given the strength of these apparent insights, the beliefs in question are very 
strongly justified. This takes care of the question whether the parties to the 
dispute can rationally disagree before disclosure. But what happens after S1 
learns of her disagreement with S2 (whom S1 takes to be an epistemic peer)? Let 
us say that the only piece of evidence that is added to S1's body of evidence after 
disclosure is S2's report of her apparent insight in support of her belief that not-
p. Does S1's recognition of this fact count as a defeater for S1's own belief that p? 
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No, says Bergmann, because, given S1's rational high confidence in her error 
theory for those peers (like S2) who reject p, S1 can rationally hold on to her 
belief: “As a result S1 remains internally rational in her belief that p despite her 
recognition that S2…believes not-p” (Bergmann 2009, 340). The same thing can, 
of course, be said of S2's belief that not-p. Bergmann further claims that these 
remarks also explain why S1 and S2 can both recognize that the other is 
internally rational in holding her respective belief. So mutually recognized 
reasonable disagreement is also possible. 
Let us now examine to what extent these observations succeed in 
explaining the possibility of reasonable disagreement after disclosure. I shall 
focus on the notion of internal rationality that Bergmann takes to be the more 
fundamental notion and, in fact, equivalent to justification. So, is reasonable 
disagreement possible when it is internal rationality that constitutes the 
epistemic status of beliefs? Again, the full answer to this question requires not 
only the investigation of the possibility of reasonable disagreement after full 
disclosure but also the possibility of the mutually recognized variety. 
Recall that a belief p is said to be internally rational if and only if it is an 
appropriate epistemic response to the agent's evidence (mental states) 
regardless of whether or not this experiential evidence is the result of cognitive 
malfunction on the part of the agent's cognitive mechanisms. Let us concede that 
S1's and S2's beliefs are internally rational before disclosure. The question is 
whether they also remain internally rational after full disclosure. After 
disclosure, S1's and S2's bodies of evidence expand to take into account what 
each learns about the other's view about p. S1 then has, in her body of evidence, 
not only her insight for the truth of p as well as the associated error theory but 
also the belief that S2 has an apparent insight that not-p. According to Bergmann, 
given the strength of S1's apparent insight for the belief p and for her error 
theory, her recognition of S2's insight for not-p will fail to undermine her 
convictions and so she will remain internally rational in believing that p. In other 
words, S1's belief that p remains an epistemically appropriate response to her 
mental states after full disclosure. Likewise for S2's belief that not-p. So 
reasonable disagreement after full disclosure is possible. 
There is, however, a slight complication here. To argue for this conclusion, 
Bergmann needs to assume that S1 and S2 maintain ‘rational high confidence in 
their respective error theories’ after full disclosure. For it is only because they 
believe their respective error theories with such high confidence that each is 
able to resist the negative epistemic influence of her newly found evidence that 
the other holds a strong insight for an incompatible belief and, thus, remain 
internally rational in her attitude towards p: 
[T]hese beliefs – of S1 in…the error theory of O1 and of S2 in…the error theory in 
O2 are each partially based on apparent insight that the propositional content of 
the belief so based is true (Bergmann 2009, 339).  
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So S1's and S2's beliefs in their respective error theories are internally 
rational. They are, on the other hand, incompatible as they pass different 
judgments on what counts as a genuine insight about p. Taken together, what 
these remarks suggest is that S1 and S2 can reasonably disagree over what 
content a genuine insight about p must have. This means that, as with Goldman's 
account, it is only by assuming that reasonable disagreement is possible at one 
level (the level of error theories) that Bergmann is able to show that it possible 
at the level of the target proposition p.  
Of course, Bergmann does not deny that sometimes recognized 
disagreement can provide one with a defeater of one's belief. Under such 
circumstances reasonable disagreement is not possible as peers are forced to 
temper their views. But what are these circumstances? According to Bergmann, 
these are circumstances in which one should disbelieve or seriously doubt that 
(C) “one is, on this occasion, more trustworthy than one's peer who holds a 
different attitude towards p.” However, he refrains from giving a general recipe 
as to when an attitude of disbelief or doubt is the epistemically appropriate 
response to one's mental states (after full disclosure). Each case, he says, should 
be examined individually. 
But it is not clear why the recognition of peer disagreement should be 
thought to undermine, say, S1's or S2's confidence in (C), that is, in believing that 
each is more trustworthy than the other with respect to p. (C) is what the error 
theories in their outlooks entail. When, for example, S1 believes on the basis of 
her error theory that the insight supporting S2's belief is not genuine, she would 
consequently take herself to be more trustworthy than S2 on the topic of p. Given 
Bergmann's own arguments, S1's recognition of S2's disagreement about p should 
not undermine her belief in her comparative reliability. If S1 is to be vulnerable 
to S2's adverse influence, one should make sure that she is no longer protected 
by her error theory. Once she loses her epistemic immunity, her beliefs will 
become vulnerable to the adverse influence of peer disagreement. But to deny 
that she is entitled to her error theory in such circumstances is to hold that peers 
cannot reasonably hold on to their beliefs in their incompatible error theories 
under such conditions. Once again, one has to assume, though in the opposite 
direction, that peer disagreement is not possible at one level (the level of error 
theories) to show that it is not possible at another level (the level of the target 
proposition).7  
                                                                        
7 Interestingly, this seems to be what happens in Feldman's 2006 conciliationist argument 
against the possibility of reasonable disagreement. Feldman denies that one can appeal to the 
different insights that the agents might have to explain the possibility of reasonable 
disagreement after full disclosure. If, prior to disclosure, S1 had good reason to think her belief 
that p is well supported, after disclosure, says Feldman, S1's expanded body of evidence would 
no longer support that belief. Rather, “it makes suspending judgment on this matter [' S1's 
belief that p is well supported'] the reasonable attitude” (232). It follows, Feldman claims, that 
the expanded body of evidence would no longer support p either because “if still does support 
p, then it supports [S1] reasonably having a complex attitude that she would express as 
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Before I turn to, what I take to be, a fundamental problem with 
Bergmann's defense of the steadfast view, it would be worthwhile to note 
another dimension with respect to which his account resembles Goldman's. We 
noted that, according to Goldman, S1 and S2 can reasonably disagree with each 
other because, though not first-order justified, they are nevertheless iteratively 
justified in holding different attitudes towards the target proposition p. This 
does not seem to be very different from what Bergmann claims about the 
internal rationality of those agents after disclosure. Although a great deal needs 
to be said about the notion of internal rationality and how it differs from external 
rationality, Bergmann's sketchy remarks and his examples can still give us a 
rough idea of how the distinction is to be understood. An internally rational 
belief, he says, has to do with what goes on in belief formation ‘downstream from 
experience’ regardless of whether or not the experience itself is due to cognitive 
malfunction. He cites, as examples of internally rational beliefs, the beliefs of the 
victims of an evil demon or a superscientist. As we have seen, however, such 
beliefs are often construed as involving iteratively justified beliefs (involving a 
truth-conducive conception of epistemic justification). Goldman himself calls 
such beliefs ‘weakly,’ as opposed to ‘strongly,’ justified.8 Weak justification does 
not imply strong justification just as, according to Bergmann, internal rationality 
is distinct from external rationality. So, at most, what follows from Bergmann's 
account is that S1's and S2's beliefs are, after disclosure, responsibly formed and 
non-culpable. But, as with Goldman's account, this is a fact that one could already 
acknowledge about S1 and S2, having recognized them as rational and 
responsible peers. 
Finally, there is something about Bergmann's way of implementing the 
standard strategy that threatens to violate, what I take to be an adequacy 
condition on an acceptable theory of reasonable disagreement. The idea is that 
an epistemology of disagreement must be sensitive to the distinction between 
reasonable disagreement in isolation and reasonable disagreement after full 
disclosure. Suppose S1 comes to believe that p as it seems to her that her 
evidence supports p. Let us further assume that since S1 has carefully examined 
her body of evidence and there is no countervailing evidence against p, S1 is 
justified in believing that p. Being aware of her fallibility and her own history 
belief formation, S1 can obviously conceive of others contradicting her belief on 
the basis of the same body of evidence. The mere conceivability of disagreement, 
however, is no bar to S1's maintaining her belief if the belief has been responsibly 
formed. We may thus grant the rationality of S1's belief in isolation. Suppose now 
S1 learns that S2 has come to believe not-p on the basis of the same body of 
                                                                                                                                                       
follows: I believe p, but I suspend judgment on whether my evidence supports p” (232). 
Whatever the merits of Feldman's argument, it shows the impossibility of reasonable 
disagreement at the level of the target proposition only by assuming it another level, namely, 
for the belief that the belief that p is well supported. 
8 See footnote 6. 
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evidence. S1 realizes that at least one of them is in error in their evaluation of the 
evidence. Who is to blame? Given that the interesting cases of disagreement are 
those where it is not obvious which belief the evidence really supports, S1 and S2 
are in a symmetrical position in so far as the question of blame is concerned.9 It 
would not thus be acceptable if S1 were to think that the error lies with S2 
(simply because it is her own belief that is at stake) without explaining why this 
is so.   
To condone S1's attitude is to fail to attach any epistemic significance to 
the distinction between reasonable disagreement in isolation and reasonable 
disagreement after full disclosure. The central question in the epistemology of 
disagreement is what one should do with one's own belief when one learns of an 
epistemic peer's contrary opinion. So I take it that any steadfast view of 
reasonable disagreement that claims that one can reasonably maintain ones' 
belief in the face of disagreement merely on the a priori ground that views 
incompatible with one's own are flawed and ought to be ignored is violating an 
adequacy condition on an acceptable theory of reasonable disagreement. In 
other words, any account of why it is reasonable to stick to one's view after full 
disclosure which rules out the information about peer disagreement as relevant 
merely on the ground that views contrary to one's own are in error is 
inadequate. This conclusion can be reinforced by noting that this way of securing 
reasonable disagreement would also undermine the epistemic significance 
between possible and actual disagreement. For what is of importance for the 
question of the possibility of reasonable disagreement is actual, rather than, 
possible peer disagreement. As noted above, the fact that one's belief might 
possibly be contradicted by similarly intelligent and intellectually virtuous 
people merely reflects our fallible and imperfect epistemic predicament. Now, it 
seems to me that that, by incorporating error theories in his theory of epistemic 
justification (rationality), Bergmann's defense of the steadfast view violates the 
aforementioned adequacy condition on an acceptable theory of reasonable 
disagreement.  
To clarify further, suppose, having argued for the view that free will is 
incompatible with determinism, van Inwagen learns of David Lewis's contrary 
opinion. After carefully examining Lewis's reasons, he decides that Lewis is in 
error. To explain, he claims that he has insights that are denied to Lewis. Now, 
while this might be, methodologically speaking, a legitimate thing to do if one 
wishes to defend a steadfast position regarding a particular dispute, it raises 
problems of the sorts mentioned above when it is turned into a general strategy 
for defending the steadfast views. For to show that agents can reasonably 
maintain their views in the face of disagreement, we must make sure that their 
cognitive systems are armed, as it were, with something like defense 
mechanisms that are, ceteris paribus, automatically activated whenever the 
agents' beliefs become vulnerable to adverse epistemic influence as in the peer 
                                                                        
9 See Feldman 2006. 
Hamid Vahid 
104 
disagreement cases. Such built-in defense mechanisms tend to epistemically 
immunize the agents against possible threats to their cognitive systems. This 
way an agent will be allowed to maintain her belief whenever she is in an 
epistemically hostile situation. Indeed, given such built-in defense mechanisms, 
the actual cases of disagreement would be as innocuous for one's views as are 
the possible ones.  
Now, this seems to be what Bergmann is doing with his postulation of 
error theories as essential ingredients of the agents' outlooks. These error 
theories are formulated in terms of the contrary views of the agents' peers. For 
example, S1's error theory rejects as not genuine the insight of any possible peer 
who believes not-p and who subscribes to another incompatible error theory. 
Thus, when S1 learns that there is an epistemic peer, S2, who actually believes the 
ingredients of O2, her cognitive defense mechanism automatically starts to kick 
in to protect her against the adverse epistemic influence of S2. Although, S1's 
error theory does not particularly target S2, it is intended to apply, as we have 
seen, to “those roughly equal in intellectual virtue who…reject p” (Bergmann 
2009, 339). This is why, the news of the S2's disagreement would hardly catch S1 
by surprise since given “S1's rational high confidence in her theory of error,” her 
recognition of S2's belief that not-p would not count as a “fairly powerful 
potential defeater” for S1's belief that p (Bergmann 2009, 340).10 S1's error 
theory would entitle S1 to her belief at any time regardless of whether or not she 
has learned of any peer disagreement. Accordingly, on Bergmann's steadfast 
view, reasonable disagreement in isolation and reasonable disagreement after 
disclosure are rendered epistemically on a par. In so far as the agents are able to 
maintain their confidence in their error theories they need not worry about 
whether or not others disagree with them.  
Another factor that ensures the irrelevance of the distinction between 
reasonable disagreement in isolation and reasonable disagreement after 
disclosure, on Bergmann's account, concerns the type of evidence that he takes 
to be germane to the rationality of one's beliefs. He takes insights to be what 
support the key ingredients of the agents' outlooks. Insights are, however, not 
the sort of things that can be fully shared:  
[E]ven after full disclosure, S1 and S2 do not have the same evidence. Reporting 
their apparent insights to each other is not the same as giving those apparent 
insights to each other (Bergmann 2009, 339).  
So, given that all the new evidence that S1 and S2 might obtain after full 
disclosure are the reports of their insights, the strength of their evidential 
situations could hardly change after they learn of each other's views. This would 
                                                                        
10 I think the same problem afflicts Goldman's OBR-account of reasonable disagreement. Once 
epistemic justification is taken to be norm-relative, agents who subscribe to a particular set of 
E-norms can safely ignore the views of those peers who adopt different E-norms and regard 
them as unjustified. 
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provide another reason why, on Bergmann's account, it hardly matters for 
determining the reasonability an agent's' view whether she is considered in 
isolation or after exposure to peer disagreement. I conclude therefore that 
Bergman's account fails to respect an adequacy condition on acceptable theories 
of reasonable disagreement.11 
Conclusion 
We have examined a number of steadfast views about how one should 
epistemically behave in the face of peer disagreement. Despite their differences, 
all such views employ, what I have called, the standard strategy. Reflecting on 
these accounts, a certain pattern emerges which explains why they are 
susceptible to the same problems. It will also help illuminate the conciliationists' 
reactions to such views. Let me explain. 
To show how epistemic peers can reasonably maintain their beliefs after 
full disclosure, the steadfast views, employing the standard strategy, tend to 
postulate some sort of epistemic asymmetry between the parties involved in a 
dispute. We have seen that different steadfast views interpret the asymmetry 
differently. Some construe it in terms of pragmatic considerations (Moffett) and 
some in terms of different epistemic norms (Goldman) while others appeal to 
different error theories (Bergmann). Thus, it seems that, to explain the 
rationality of the agents' first-order beliefs about a particular proposition p in 
the case of a disagreement, we have to go one level up and assume that the 
agents have certain fundamental beliefs about, say, which epistemic norms are 
correct and justification-conferring or which evidence or insights are genuine. 
For Goldman it was the postulation of the objectively justified beliefs about the 
correct E-norms that grounded incompatible but rational attitudes towards the 
target proposition while, for Bergmann, it was the agents' rational beliefs about 
the pertinent error theories that allowed them to rationally maintain their 
beliefs after full disclosure. Despite its clear relevance to the question of the 
possibility of reasonable disagreement, the standard strategy is apt to make the 
steadfast views that employ it vulnerable to the following general problems. 
1. Although the postulation of certain antecedent rational beliefs, on the 
part of the epistemic peers, is, as we have just seen, necessary to explain how 
                                                                        
11 At the end of his discussion, Bergmann makes some remarks which seem to suggest that he 
is not willing to attach much epistemic significance to the distinction between possible and 
actual disagreement. First, he points out, correctly, that the fact that it is possible for things to 
seem to us perceptually just as they do even if we are the victims of an evil demon does not 
imply that we should question the reliability of our perceptual beliefs. Likewise, he claim, the 
fact that we think our peer is mistaken, despite being equally confident as we are in our 
beliefs, does not justify revising those beliefs. He realizes, however, that while his first case 
concerns the mere possibility of skepticism, the second case concerns an actual scenario in 
which we are being challenged. He thinks, however, that “the lesson is the same nevertheless” 
(Bergmann 2009, 545). 
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they can rationally disagree about a particular proposition, it makes the 
steadfast views susceptible to the charge of begging the question against 
conciliationism. For to assume that agents rationally hold such fundamental and 
incompatible beliefs is to assume that rational disagreement is possible. We saw 
that, on Goldman's account, agents are O-justified in believing incompatible E-
norms to be correct while, for Bergmann, they enjoy rational confidence in 
different error theories. So both accounts try to show that rational disagreement 
is possible at the level of the target proposition only by assuming that it is 
possible at another (more fundamental) level. 
2. Another problem for the standard strategy is whether it can establish 
the possibility of both reasonable disagreement and mutually recognized 
reasonable disagreement after full disclosure. For what seems necessary for the 
possibility of reasonable disagreement seems to render mutually recognized 
reasonable disagreement impossible. For example, while, for Bergmann, the 
assumption that agents hold different error theories is necessary in order to 
explain how they can remain rational after full disclosure, that very same 
assumption seems to hinder the possibility of mutually recognized peer 
disagreement. This is, of course, to be expected if an agent is to remain justified 
in believing her error theory after full disclosure. What is, at most, mutually 
recognizable by epistemic peers is that the other enjoys iterated justification in 
her belief about the target proposition. The same thing is true about Goldman's 
OBR-account which explicitly endorses only iterated justification for the target 
proposition. Regardless of whether such an attenuated notion is sufficient to 
establish the possible of reasonability disagreement, the problem with this 
suggestion is that one could already acknowledge its tenability without 
adverting to the various epistemological frameworks promulgated by the 
steadfast views such as Goldman's or Bergmann's. Iteratively justified belief, as 
non-culpable belief that is responsibly formed, is what is to be expected from 
agents who recognize each other as rational peers. 
3. Finally, the implementation of the standard strategy is apt to lead to the 
violation of an adequacy condition on an acceptable theory of reasonable 
disagreement, namely, the recognition of the epistemological significance of the 
distinction between reasonable disagreement in isolation and reasonable 
disagreement after disclosure. We saw that once the standard strategy is used at 
the service of explaining the reasonability of disagreement it is bound to turn 
into a defense mechanism that would eventually obviate the epistemological 
significance of the aforementioned distinction. 
For these reasons, I conclude that the steadfast views had better look into 
options other than adopting the standard strategy. 
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